Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00427.XMaRDI QIDQ5429097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely

Publication date 29 November 2007

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00427.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
• Mechanism design
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• Strategically simple mechanisms

Cited in

(47)

• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Surplus extraction with rich type spaces
• On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
• Auction design with heterogeneous priors
• Robust incentives for risk
• On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
• Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
• Correlation-robust auction design
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
• Maxmin implementation
• Robust implementation with costly information
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
• Mechanism design with model specification
• Strategically simple mechanisms
• (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
• Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3949158 (Why is no real title available?)
• On robust constitution design
• Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty
• Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and -concavity
• On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• On the robustness of Laissez-Faire
• Robust contracting under distributional uncertainty
• Revealed reasoning
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

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