Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.002MaRDI QIDQ5963306zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors C. R. Müller

Publication date 7 March 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:374644/UQ374644_OA.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common strong belief in rationalityextensive-form rationalizabilityrobust implementationstrategic distinguishabilitystrong rationalizabilityvirtual implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Robust dynamic implementation
• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation

Cites work

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• Robust dynamic implementation
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
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• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(22)

• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
• Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
• IQ, expectations, and choice
• Optimal feedback in contests
• Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
• A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
• A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
• A more credible approach to parallel trends
• Testing the production approach to markup estimation
• Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
• Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Topology-free type structures with conditioning events
• Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
• Robust dynamic implementation

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