Continuous virtual implementation: complete information

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102605MaRDI QIDQ2668986zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ritesh Jain, Michele Lombardi

Publication date 9 March 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgesocial choice rulesvirtual implementationcontinuous implementationuniform-weak topology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Continuous implementation
• Exact implementation
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
• Level-k mechanism design
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Uniform topologies on types
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(7)

• Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Continuous implementation
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
• Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information

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