Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2018.0972MaRDI QIDQ5108244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano

Publication date 30 April 2020

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ffe34a7b38fae1edcd516836813a08a404b9766f

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationimplementationMaskin monotonicityrationalizabilitysocial choice correspondenceuniform monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
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• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation

Cites work

• A characterization of egalitarian equivalence
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• Exact implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(11)

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
• Safe implementation
• Two-player rationalizable implementation

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