Two-player rationalizable implementation
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Bayesian Implementation
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Continuous implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable implementation
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Repeated Nash implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Toward Natural Implementation
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