Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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Recommendations
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
Cited in
(66)- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- The revelation approach to Nash implementation
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Solomon's dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Implementation via rights structures
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- On implementation via demand commitment games
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
- On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Implementation of voting operators
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Nash implementation with little communication
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Picking the winners
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Implementation theory
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- A strategic aspect of the strong positive association condition
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
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