Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures

DOI10.1007/S11238-025-10051-1MaRDI QIDQ6920728zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Aymeric Lardon, Stéphane Gonzalez

Publication date 6 October 2025

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-025-10051-1

zbMATH Keywords

coreimplementationaxiomatization\(\mathcal{O}\)-consistency\(\Omega\)-equilibria setobjections structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• On the vertices of the k-additive core
• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• k-balanced games and capacities

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