Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
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Cited in
(67)- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Interactive implementation
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Contingent commodities and implementation
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
- Privacy in implementation
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Implementation via rights structures
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
- Implementation in generic environments
- Virtual repeated implementation
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Strictly strategy-proof auctions
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Time and Nash implementation
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation with evidence
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Implementation theory
- Meta level equilibrium selection for two illustrative noncooperative games
- Compromising as an equal loss principle
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Credible implementation
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
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