Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
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- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
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- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Divide-and-permute
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Picking the winners
- Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
- Implementation with evidence
- Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments
- Implementation theory
- Rationalizable implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Computational implementation
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Implementation of welfare maximizing networks
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting
- Anonymous implementation
- Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
- Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Ex post implementation
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