Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
In this paper it is shown for exchange economies with special preferences firstly, that Walrasian correspondences (mappings, that associate to each economy (preference profile) their set of Walrasian allocations) are not implementable in any of the (responsive) solution concepts considered in the implementation literature. This happens because of the so-called boundary problem: A Walrasian correspondence depends also on the shape of some preferences outside the feasible set. Secondly under conditions imposing especially differentiability of preferences, i.e. of their utility functions, some special results follow implementing the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Walrasian economy and some properties of convexly compact sets
- Walras allocations in infinite dimensional economies
- The equilibrium set of infinite dimensional Walrasian economies and the natural projection
- Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
- Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Bargaining and competition revisited.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Divide-and-permute
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Switching from complete to incomplete information
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Walrasian bargaining.
- Strategy space reduction for feasible implementation of Walrasian performance
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
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