Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
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Recommendations
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Walrasian economy and some properties of convexly compact sets
- Walras allocations in infinite dimensional economies
- The equilibrium set of infinite dimensional Walrasian economies and the natural projection
- Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
- Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Bargaining and competition revisited.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Divide-and-permute
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Switching from complete to incomplete information
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Walrasian bargaining.
Cited in
(8)- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
- Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
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