Anonymous implementation

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01635-5MaRDI QIDQ7324091zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, Muhammed Dönmez

Publication date 2 September 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01635-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

• A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Computational implementation
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
• Safe implementation
• Sticky matching in school choice
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Symmetric games revisited
• Symmetric mechanism design
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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