Implementation of welfare maximizing networks

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01611-ZMaRDI QIDQ7233065zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede

Publication date 24 April 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01611-Z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

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