On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
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Publication:6076923
DOI10.3982/te4289aOpenAlexW4385060659MaRDI QIDQ6076923
Unnamed Author, Christian Trudeau
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4289a
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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