On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion

DOI10.3982/TE4289AMaRDI QIDQ6076923zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4289a

zbMATH Keywords

costly inclusionfree-rider problemGroves mechanismlabor marketspivot mechanismVickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)

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Cited in

(4)

• The pipeline externalities problem
• Preconvex games
• Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship
• Implementation of welfare maximizing networks

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