A limit theorem on the minmax set

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90024-6zbMATH Open0471.90009OpenAlexW2009160679MaRDI QIDQ1158069FDOQ1158069

Authors: Gabrielle Demange 

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90024-6

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerlimit theoremminimax setsingle peakednessintermediate preferencesmajority winners

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces
• Equilibrium under @a-Majority Voting
• On Variable Majority Rule and Kramer's Dynamic Competitive Process

Cited In (4)

• When Walras meets Vickrey
• On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model

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