Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00026-2zbMath1111.91313WikidataQ126771633 ScholiaQ126771633MaRDI QIDQ1296500

Laura Razzolini, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ExcludableIndivisiblePublic projectVoluntary cost sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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