Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1296500
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00026-2zbMATH Open1111.91313WikidataQ126771633 ScholiaQ126771633MaRDI QIDQ1296500FDOQ1296500
Publication date: 2 August 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentives in Teams
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
Cited In (16)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
- An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
This page was built for publication: Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1296500)
