Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
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Cites work
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
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