A new necessary condition for Nash implementation

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00014-1MaRDI QIDQ1300507zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date 10 May 2000

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationMaskin monotonicity\(B_k\)-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation

Cited in

(9)

• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• A strategic aspect of the strong positive association condition
• New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

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