Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
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Publication:2351207
DOI10.3390/g4010038zbMath1314.91119OpenAlexW2151097991MaRDI QIDQ2351207
Publication date: 23 June 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010038
Related Items (6)
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
Cites Work
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- Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
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