A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
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Publication:1300507
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00014-1zbMath0937.91044MaRDI QIDQ1300507
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
Cites Work
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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