Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.010zbMath1255.91090OpenAlexW1977695423MaRDI QIDQ1934849

Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityunanimityNash implementationno veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

Cites Work

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Constitutional implementation.
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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