Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:1934849
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.12.010zbMATH Open1255.91090OpenAlexW1977695423MaRDI QIDQ1934849FDOQ1934849
Authors: Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad 
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.010
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Constitutional implementation.
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
Cited In (9)
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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