Nash implementation in rationing problems with single-crossing preferences
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Publication:486479
DOI10.1515/MEL-2013-0019zbMATH Open1303.91069OpenAlexW2169133081MaRDI QIDQ486479FDOQ486479
Authors: Ahmed Doghmi
Publication date: 15 January 2015
Published in: Mathematical Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/mel-2013-0019
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- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
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