Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces

DOI10.2307/1911705MaRDI QIDQ3796922zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Reichelstein, Stanley Reiter

Publication date 1988

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911705

zbMATH Keywords

decentralizationexchange economyminimal implementationminimal realizationperformance standardsize of a message spaceWalrasian allocation rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
• Nash implementation with little communication
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information

Cited in

(23)

• Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
• Strategy space reduction for feasible implementation of Walrasian performance
• A lower bound for the dimension of the message space of the decentralized mechanisms realizing a given goal
• Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
• Comparing finite mechanisms
• Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
• A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms
• Inductive reasoning in social choice theory
• Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
• Divide-and-permute
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• A simple implementation of efficient allocations
• Computational implementation
• The Walker-Groves-Ledyard mechanism: improving individual rationality without sacrificing simplicity or stability
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions
• Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

This page was built for publication: Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3796922)