Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.04.031zbMath1376.91102arXiv1610.06734OpenAlexW2541696016MaRDI QIDQ1683167

Srikrishna Bhashyam, H. Vinay, D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan

Publication date: 6 December 2017

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.06734

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingeconomicsauctions/biddinguncertain convex program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Convex programming (90C25) Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

The characterization of affine maximizers on restricted domains with two alternatives

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