Motives and implementation with rights structures
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Publication:2037002
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Cites work
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Implementation via rights structures
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
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