Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A neutral social function must be monotonic and simple to be fully implementable under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept. If a neutral social function is monotonic and simple, then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is monotonic, simple and dictatorial.
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation in pure public good economies
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
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- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
- Majority Voting and Social Choice
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
- General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- A note on the `surjectivity property'
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