Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions

DOI10.2307/2297367MaRDI QIDQ3942700zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date 1982

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-145311553

zbMATH Keywords

equilibria for n-person gamesimplementable social choice functionminimally democratic setpublic goodssophisticated equilibriumunrestricted preference domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(10)

• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Structural instability of the core
• Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Weakly implementable social choice rules
• On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold

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