Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
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Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
Cited in
(11)- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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