A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.013zbMATH Open1296.91208OpenAlexW2097598957MaRDI QIDQ405557FDOQ405557

Authors: Ville Korpela 

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationsufficient conditionstrong equilibriummatching rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations

Cited In (13)

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• A strategic aspect of the strong positive association condition
• New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness

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