Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.007zbMATH Open1330.91101OpenAlexW2161967124MaRDI QIDQ900451FDOQ900451

Authors: Marion Oury 

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.007

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zbMATH Keywords

robust implementationhigh order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Continuous implementation
• The robust selection of rationalizability
• Critical types
• Robust mechanism design. The role of private information and higher order beliefs. With a foreword by Eric Maskin
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• Uniform topologies on types

Cited In (3)

• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

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