Locally robust implementation and its limits
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.012zbMATH Open1276.91080OpenAlexW2132105654MaRDI QIDQ694745FDOQ694745
Authors: Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu 
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012
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Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Efficient Auctions
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Continuous implementation
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- The robustness of robust implementation
Cited In (7)
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Auction design with heterogeneous priors
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
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