Locally robust implementation and its limits

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.012zbMATH Open1276.91080OpenAlexW2132105654MaRDI QIDQ694745FDOQ694745

Authors Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date 13 December 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post implementationbilinear value functionlocally robust implementationquasi-linear Bernoulli utility functionregular allocation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Continuous implementation
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• The robustness of robust implementation

Cited in

(7)

• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
• Auction design with heterogeneous priors
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge

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