Locally robust implementation and its limits
From MaRDI portal
Publication:694745
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012zbMath1276.91080MaRDI QIDQ694745
Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Philippe Jehiel
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012
ex-post implementation; bilinear value function; locally robust implementation; quasi-linear Bernoulli utility function; regular allocation function
91B44: Economics of information
91B08: Individual preferences
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
91B14: Social choice
91B69: Heterogeneous agent models
Related Items
Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design, Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge, Locally robust contracts for moral hazard, Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction, Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms, Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
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