Locally robust implementation and its limits

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012zbMath1276.91080MaRDI QIDQ694745

Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 13 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post implementation; bilinear value function; locally robust implementation; quasi-linear Bernoulli utility function; regular allocation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

91B08: Individual preferences

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

91B14: Social choice

91B69: Heterogeneous agent models

Related Items

Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design, Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge, Locally robust contracts for moral hazard, Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction, Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms, Continuous virtual implementation: complete information

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