Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2067386
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105088zbMATH Open1481.91045arXiv1811.01320OpenAlexW3039850066MaRDI QIDQ2067386FDOQ2067386
Authors: Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon 
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper studies a robust version of the classic surplus extraction problem, in which the designer knows only that the beliefs of each type belong to some set, and designs mechanisms that are suitable for all possible beliefs in that set. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for full extraction in this setting, and show that these are natural set-valued analogues of the classic convex independence condition identified by Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988). We show that full extraction is neither generically possible nor generically impossible, in contrast to the standard setting in which full extraction is generic. When full extraction fails, we show that natural additional conditions can restrict both the nature of the contracts a designer can offer and the surplus the designer can obtain.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.01320
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
- Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces
- Utility representation of an incomplete preference relation
- Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Multiperson utility
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Objective and subjective rationality in a multiple prior model
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom: A Correction
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- The design of ambiguous mechanisms
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Continuity in auction design
- Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited
- Surplus extraction and competition
- Representation of subjective preferences under ambiguity
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Knightian analysis of the Vickrey mechanism
Cited In (9)
- The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
- Auction design with heterogeneous priors
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
This page was built for publication: Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2067386)
