Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
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Publication:617680
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003zbMath1203.91136OpenAlexW3123576996MaRDI QIDQ617680
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003
Related Items (2)
Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
Cites Work
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- Ex post implementation
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- Unnamed Item
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