Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
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Publication:617680
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.08.003zbMATH Open1203.91136OpenAlexW3123576996MaRDI QIDQ617680FDOQ617680
Authors: Sushil Bikhchandani 
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003
Recommendations
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Information Acquisition and Welfare
- Information acquisition and countervailing incentives
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
- Unrestricted information acquisition
- Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
Cites Work
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Information acquisition in committees
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Ex post implementation
- The value of information for auctioneers
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- Continuity in auction design
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
Cited In (10)
- Information Acquisition and Welfare
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
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