Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.002zbMath1239.91065MaRDI QIDQ423718

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversion; mechanism design; auction theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B16: Utility theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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