Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
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Publication:423718
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.002zbMath1239.91065OpenAlexW2138108189MaRDI QIDQ423718
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.002
Related Items (28)
Mechanism design and intentions ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes ⋮ Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models ⋮ Public goods with ambiguity in large economies ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions ⋮ The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions ⋮ Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties ⋮ Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Robust screening under ambiguity ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Maxmin implementation ⋮ On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games ⋮ Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Revealed reasoning ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
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