Implementation under ambiguity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.010MaRDI QIDQ522998zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luciano I. de Castro, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmaximin equilibriummaximin preferencesmaximin efficient allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3061365 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
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• Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
• Bayesian Implementation
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• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
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• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• Preference for safety under the Choquet model: in search of a characterization
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
• Value allocation under ambiguity

Cited in

(21)

• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Ambiguity and price competition
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• On stochastic independence under ambiguity
• Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
• Robust coalitional implementation
• On endogenous formation of price expectations
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
• Maxmin implementation

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