Recommendations
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3061365 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
- Bayesian Implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Preference for safety under the Choquet model: in search of a characterization
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Value allocation under ambiguity
Cited in
(21)- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Ambiguity and price competition
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- On stochastic independence under ambiguity
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Robust coalitional implementation
- On endogenous formation of price expectations
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
- Maxmin implementation
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