Implementation under ambiguity
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Publication:522998
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010zbMath1393.91111OpenAlexW2210921810MaRDI QIDQ522998
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Luciano I. de Castro, Zhi-Wei Liu
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)
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