Implementation under ambiguity
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Publication:522998
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.010zbMATH Open1393.91111OpenAlexW2210921810MaRDI QIDQ522998FDOQ522998
Authors: Luciano I. de Castro, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu 
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.010
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Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Decomposition-integral: unifying Choquet and the concave integrals
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- Bayesian Implementation
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
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- Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
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- Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
Cited In (16)
- On stochastic independence under ambiguity
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Ambiguity and price competition
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- On endogenous formation of price expectations
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
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