Core and equilibria under ambiguity

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Publication:641837


DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0637-3zbMath1277.91125MaRDI QIDQ641837

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Marialaura Pesce, Luciano I. de Castro

Publication date: 25 October 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59653


91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B50: General equilibrium theory


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