A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy
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Publication:2376993
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0689-zzbMath1273.91288OpenAlexW2047303246MaRDI QIDQ2376993
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55195
Related Items (4)
A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: efficiency and implementation ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy ⋮ Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory ⋮ Testing Pareto efficiency and competitive equilibrium in economies with public goods
Cites Work
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- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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