Ambiguous implementation: the partition model

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1023-YzbMATH Open1404.91153OpenAlexW2564410999MaRDI QIDQ514494FDOQ514494

Authors: Luciano I. de Castro, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu 

Publication date: 2 March 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationmaximin equilibriummaximin preferencesmaximin efficient allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
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• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
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• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Bayesian Implementation
• Why uncertainty matters: discounting under intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Bayesian learning with multiple priors and nonvanishing ambiguity
• Credible implementation
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

Cited In (14)

• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity

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