Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7zbMath1395.91096OpenAlexW2521612616MaRDI QIDQ2627913

Frédéric Koessler, Mehdi Ayouni

Publication date: 1 June 2017

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitymechanism designmaxmin expected utilitycertifiable informationevidence disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (2)

Ambiguous persuasion ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium

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