Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
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Publication:2067384
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105072zbMath1481.91084OpenAlexW3002379378MaRDI QIDQ2067384
Sarah Auster, Christian Kellner
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/440982/1/revision.pdf
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