First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders
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Publication:3095017
DOI10.3982/TE502zbMATH Open1278.91080OpenAlexW2123865781MaRDI QIDQ3095017FDOQ3095017
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te502
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- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
- Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- The two faces of independence: betweenness and homotheticity
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- On the consensus effect
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
- Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
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