First-price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy-it-now prices with Allais paradox bidders

DOI10.3982/TE502MaRDI QIDQ3095017zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daisuke Nakajima

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te502

zbMATH Keywords

Allais paradoxDutch auctionsbuy-it-now pricesdescending auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(9)

• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
• Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
• On the consensus effect
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
• The two faces of independence: betweenness and homotheticity
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity

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