Strategically simple mechanisms

DOI10.3982/ECTA15897MaRDI QIDQ4971285zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors

Publication date 12 October 2020

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.00849

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral tradefirst-order belieflocal dictatorshipmechanism designstrategic simplicityvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Voting theory (91B12) Trade models (91B60)

Abstract: We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.

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Cited in

(15)

• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Correlation-robust auction design
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
• Obvious manipulations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897421 (Why is no real title available?)
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
• Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
• Computational implementation
• Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

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