Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
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Cites work
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Non-bossiness
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Obvious manipulations
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
- On cores and indivisibility
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Strategically simple mechanisms
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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