Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization

DOI10.1111/IERE.12538MaRDI QIDQ5072059zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 25 April 2022

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12538

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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(7)

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• On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
• A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

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