Algorithmic and structural complexities of menus in unit-demand auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_1MaRDI QIDQ7299252zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Daniel Schoepflin, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date 17 July 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Descending price multi-item auctions
• Deterministic budget-feasible clock auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7829281 (Why is no real title available?)
• Impossibilities for obviously strategy-proof mechanisms
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

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