Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
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- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187072
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cites work
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Non-bossiness
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
Cited in
(5)- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
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