Robust implementation with costly information

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE016MaRDI QIDQ7008382zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Harry Di Pei, Bruno Strulovici

Publication date 21 March 2025

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE016

zbMATH Keywords

critical path lemmapartial implementationrobust implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Continuous implementation
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Generalized belief operator and robustness in binary-action supermodular games
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• Robust equilibria under non-common priors
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

This page was built for publication: Robust implementation with costly information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7008382)