Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
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- \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
- On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
- Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
- Regular potential games
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Agency, potential and contagion
- Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
- \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
- Log-linear dynamics and local potential
- Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
- Dynamic potential games: the discrete-time stochastic case
- Generalized belief operator and robustness in binary-action supermodular games
- Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
- An improved algorithm for detecting potential games
- Potential games in volatile environments
- Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric 3 3 example
- On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
- Random utility coordination games on networks
- Perfect information and potential games
- Robust implementation with costly information
- Best response equivalence
- An algorithmic analysis of parallel contests
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
- Potential games with incomplete preferences
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
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