Log-linear dynamics and local potential

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.011MaRDI QIDQ417624zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daijiro Okada, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2008-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityequilibrium selectionstochastic ordercomparison of Markov chainslocal potential maximizerlog-linear dynamicrelative log-linear dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Economic dynamics (91B55)

Recommendations

• The logit-response dynamics
• The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
• Robust stochastic stability
• Metastability of asymptotically well-behaved potential games
• Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3886933 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 758785 (Why is no real title available?)
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks
• Deciding Linear Inequalities by Computing Loop Residues
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Log-linear dynamics and local potential
• Potential games
• Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems
• Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• Stochastic Orderings for Markov Processes on Partially Ordered Spaces
• Stochastic inequalities on partially ordered spaces
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• The logit-response dynamics
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction

Cited in

(10)

• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
• Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
• Ordinal potentials in smooth games
• Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
• Log-linear dynamics and local potential
• Robust stochastic stability
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• The logit-response dynamics

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