On robust constitution design
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 578421 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 699423 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- Incentives in Teams
- Optimal Auction Design
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
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