Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01186-8MaRDI QIDQ2308792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benoit Decerf, Frank Riedel

Publication date 3 April 2020

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01186-8

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversiondisambiguationEllsberg gamesKnightian uncertaintypurification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

• Ellsberg games
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Purification and roulette wheels
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• The purification problems for constrained games with incomplete information

Cites work

• Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Attitude toward imprecise information
• Ellsberg games
• Game theory
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
• Robust Statistics
• The design of ambiguous mechanisms
• The right to remain silent
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

Cited in

(6)

• Purification of incentive compatible allocations
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Ellsberg games
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• On stochastic independence under ambiguity

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