Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01186-8zbMath1435.91012OpenAlexW2923494830MaRDI QIDQ2308792

Frank Riedel, Benoit Decerf

Publication date: 3 April 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01186-8

zbMATH Keywords

disambiguationambiguity aversionKnightian uncertaintypurificationEllsberg games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

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